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Foreign Income and Domestic Deductions

Foreign Income and Domestic Deductions
Abstract - To what extent should taxpayers deduct expenses incurred domestically that contribute to foreign income production?
It is widely believed that if the home country does not tax foreign
income, then it also should not permit deductions for that portion
of domestic expenses attributable to earning foreign income. This
prescription is, however, inconsistent with the decision to exempt
foreign income from taxation in the first place. The paper shows that,
for any system of taxing foreign income, the consistent and efficient
treatment is to permit domestic expense deductions for all expenses
incurred domestically. This differs from the current U.S. regime,
under which American firms were required to allocate more than
$110 billion of domestic expenses against foreign income in 2004.

INTRODUCTION

I

James R. Hines Jr.
Department of
Economics,
University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
and
NBER, Cambridge, MA
02138
National Tax Journal
Vol. LXI, No. 3
September 2008

ncome tax systems, such as that used by the United States,
permit taxpayers to claim deductions for expenses incurred
in the course of earning income. Thus, a taxpayer who spends
$100 on labor and materials to produce output subsequently
sold for $140 will be taxed on income of only $40, since the
$100 expense is deductible for tax purposes. Any sensible
income tax must permit expense deductions, since otherwise
it becomes a form of turnover tax, taxing gross rather than
net income, overstating the incomes of some taxpayers, and
reducing the efficiency of the economy by prompting excessive vertical integration and discouraging other activities that
add economic value.
In an open economy, a taxpayer may incur expenses in
one jurisdiction that contribute to producing income in other
jurisdictions. What is the appropriate tax treatment of such
expenses?
It is natural to match expense deductions against revenue
attributable to the expenses. As a practical matter, however,
considerable challenges arise in matching deductions against
income for certain types of expenses, such as interest expense
or general and administrative expense, that are general to a
firm and difficult to attribute to particular activities. If a large
multinational firm headquartered in the United States and
with operations in 20 other countries spends $80 million on
headquarters activities in the United States, the foreign countries typically do not permit the firm to take local tax deductions for any portion of the $80 million headquarters expense.
What then should be the policy of the home country—should
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inefficient from the standpoint of single
investment decisions in isolation, since
from this perspective they seem to give
excessive incentives to invest in low–tax
foreign countries. Hence, if an exemption system is efficient, it must be that
its efficiency stems from considerations
omitted by considering just one investment at a time. Since new investments
trigger reactions by investors and their
competitors, it is important to incorporate
these reactions in evaluating the welfare
properties of exempting foreign income
from home country taxation. It is from the
standpoint of all of the induced reactions
that permitting full domestic expense
deductibility makes considerable sense,
since the failure to permit deductibility
would distort asset ownership patterns
and thereby reduce the productivity of
domestic business operations.
It should not be surprising that a fully
efficient tax system permits complete
deductibility of domestic expenses. It
is an efficient, and virtually universal,
practice to permit full deductibility of
domestic expenses incurred by firms that
earn only domestic income, since efficient
taxation preserves incentives to spend $1
to create more than $1 of pretax economic
return. But a tax system that maximizes
the welfare of the residence country also
taxes foreign income in a way that makes
the residence country indifferent between
a marginal dollar of activity undertaken
by one of its firms at home or abroad. If
this were not so—if, for example, the home
government would prefer that its firms
concentrate more of their activity at home
at the expense of activities abroad—then
the tax treatment of foreign income must
not be optimal in the first place. Hence,
with optimal tax systems the value of
foreign activity at the margin is the same
as the value of domestic activity, so if
an expense is properly deductible when
producing domestic income, efficiency
requires that it also be deductible when
producing foreign income.

the firm be permitted to deduct the $80
million against its U.S. income or should
that deduction be limited by apportioning
some fraction of the $80 million against its
income in other countries?
The common answer to this question is
that it depends on the nature of the home
country tax regime. So this reasoning goes,
the firm should be permitted to claim
home country deductions only for that
part of an expense that produces income
taxed by the home country. Hence, if a firm
is resident in a country that taxes domestic
but not foreign income, it follows that the
portion of domestic expenses incurred to
produce foreign income should not be
deductible in the home country.
The analysis in this paper takes issue
with this answer, instead concluding that
the only policy consistent with efficiency,
given the refusal of foreign governments
to allow taxpayers to take deductions
for general expenses incurred outside
their countries, is to permit full domestic
deductibility of expenses incurred in the
home country. Full domestic deductibility
is a feature of any efficient tax regime,
including residence based worldwide
tax systems with and without provision
of foreign tax credits, and a system in
which the home country exempts active
foreign business income from taxation.
All that is necessary is that the home
country tax regime be tailored to promote
home country welfare efficiently, and if it
is, then full domestic deductibility is an
efficient policy.
The claim that full domestic deductibility of home country expenses promotes
efficiency is perhaps unintuitive and is
certainly inconsistent with current U.S.
policy and most prior analysis of this
subject. In order to appreciate why full
domestic deductibility is efficient, it is
necessary to understand why countries
have the international tax systems they do.
This is particularly important in the cases
of countries that exempt foreign income
from taxation. Such tax systems appear
462
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and while these typically apply even
to purely domestic firms, there may be
additional restrictions on interest deductions taken by foreign–owned firms and
firms whose foreign affiliates have capital
structures that differ greatly from those of
their parent companies. In addition, there
are countries that exempt slightly less
than 100 percent of active foreign business
income (France exempts only 95 percent,
for example) to compensate, in some very
rough sense, for permitting full domestic
deductibility of home country expenses.

The second section of the paper
describes international practice in permitting expense deductions and reviews
evidence of the impact of the U.S. system
of allocating domestic expenses against
foreign income. The third section of the
paper summarizes the efficiency rationales underlying competing systems of
taxing foreign income. The fourth section
analyzes the deductibility of domestic
expenses with worldwide and territorial
(exemption) tax systems, finding in every
case that the efficient treatment corresponds to full domestic deductibility. The
fifth section is the conclusion.

U.S. Expense Allocation Rules and Their
Impact

DOMESTIC EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS
IN PRACTICE

The United States currently allows
full deductibility of domestic expenses,
but also requires taxpayers to allocate
domestic expenses against foreign income
for purposes of calculating foreign tax
credits, thereby effectively limiting the
deductibility of these expenses in some
cases. Different rules apply to research
and development (R&D) expenses, interest expenses, and other expenses that are
supportive in nature, including overhead,
general and administrative expenses,
supervisory expenses, advertising, marketing, and other sales expenses. In the
case of supportive expenses, such as general and administrative expenses, firms
are entitled to deduct expenses incurred
in the United States, but must allocate a
portion of these expenses against foreign
income based on the fraction of total
income from foreign sources or activity
undertaken in foreign countries. The
significance of allocating these expenses
against foreign income is that doing
so reduces the foreign tax credit limit,
thereby reducing the taxpayer’s ability
to offset its U.S. tax liability on foreign
income with credits for foreign income tax
payments. This is consequential only for

The tax treatment of domestic expenses
incurred by multinational businesses
varies between countries and over time
within the same country. Most of the world
exempts active foreign business income
from taxation and also effectively permits
taxpayers full domestic tax deductions
for general domestic business expenses,
such as interest expense and general and
administrative expenses. The details of
these policies differ among countries;
some permit blanket domestic expense
deductibility, whereas others use tracing
rules that require taxpayers to identify the
income streams that deductible expenses
are incurred to produce.1 As a practical
matter, tracing rules are largely equivalent
to blanket domestic deductibility (Shaviro,
2001), since the unwillingness of foreign
governments to grant tax deductions for
domestic expenses gives taxpayers incentives to arrange their tracing to maximize
domestic deductions. Most countries
limit the deductibility of domestic interest expenses with “thin capitalization”
rules of one form or another (Buettner,
Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser 2008),
1

U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (2008) describes the practices of other countries, and Slaats (2007)
offers a review of recent international developments in the deductibility of interest and other expenses.
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the remaining half apportioned between
domestic and foreign source based on
relative sales or income. For all of these
expenses the allocation rules matter only
if taxpayers have excess foreign tax credits, in which case they are tantamount to
denying domestic deductions for that portion of expenses allocated against foreign
income. Different rules prevailed prior to
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
and the evidence indicates that American firms with excess foreign tax credits
responded to the tax reform by changing
their domestic borrowing patterns and
domestic R&D spending around the end
of 1986 in reaction to the higher after–tax
cost of domestic borrowing and domestic
R&D activity.2
These rules significantly influence the
tax positions of American firms. Table 1
presents data on the aggregate volume of
corporate expense deductions allocated
against foreign income between 1992 and
2004. In 2004, American corporations allocated $110.8 billion of domestic expenses
against foreign income, of which interest
expenses accounted for $42.0 billion and
R&D expenses accounted for $13.5 billion. Total allocated domestic expense
represents more than 45 percent of the
$241.5 billion taxable foreign income of
American firms in that year, and was even
higher fractions of taxable foreign income
in other years.3
Table 2 provides an industry breakdown
of these allocated domestic expenses
in 2004. Manufacturing corporations
allocated $46.1 billion of total domestic
expenses against foreign income of $154.6

taxpayers with excess foreign tax credits,
since for those without excess foreign tax
credits the limit does not bind. American
taxpayers have excess foreign tax credits if
their average foreign tax rates exceed the
U.S. rate, and in the absence of expense
allocation these taxpayers would owe
no U.S. tax on their foreign incomes. For
these taxpayers, reducing by one dollar
the net foreign income used to calculate
the foreign tax credit limit increases their
U.S. tax liability by an amount equal to the
marginal U.S. tax rate. This exactly offsets
the value of the original deduction, so the
U.S. system effectively denies domestic
expense deductions for the allocated
portion of general and administrative
expenses incurred by taxpayers with foreign income taxed so heavily by foreign
governments that it winds up untaxed
by the United States. Taxpayers whose
foreign income is lightly taxed by foreign
governments, and who, therefore, owe
residual U.S. tax on that income, receive
the benefit of full domestic deductibility of
expenses incurred in the United States.
Different, and rather more strict, rules
apply to the allocation of interest expenses
and R&D expenses, though with similar
effect. Interest expenses are allocated
against foreign source income based on
relative values of domestic and foreign
assets as calculated using a method that
is widely criticized (e.g., Shaviro (2001) on
several grounds, including that it ignores
foreign borrowing; this system is currently
scheduled to change in 2009. Half of a
multinational firm’s U.S. R&D expense
is allocated against U.S. income, with
2

3

Collins and Shackelford (1992), Froot and Hines (1995) and Altshuler and Mintz (1995) analyze responses
to the interest allocation rules introduced in 1986, and Hines (1993) analyzes the response of R&D activity
to changes in the R&D expense allocation rules. These studies provide greater detail on the reforms and the
incentives they created.
Expense allocation matters only if a firm has excess foreign tax credits, which not all American firms do, so
it would be inaccurate to conclude that allocating $110 billion of expenses to foreign income at a tax rate of
35 percent increases the U.S. tax liabilities of American firms by $38.5 billion. But since a taxpayer’s foreign
tax credit status is itself the product of many purposeful choices that are influenced by the expense allocation
rules, it is not correct either to take the foreign tax credit status as given in evaluating the cost of expense allocation.
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TABLE 1
DOMESTIC CORPORATE EXPENSES ALLOCATED AGAINST FOREIGN INCOME, 1992–2004

Total

Research and
development

Interest

Other

Taxable
foreign
income
(less loss)
before
adjustments

46,074,597
56,490,849
60,002,879
79,650,578
88,355,742
94,428,510
94,247,133
102,542,312
125,377,761
109,909,312
79,729,471
93,226,238
110,817,387

3,322,556
3,031,964
4,937,048
8,198,150
9,232,584
9,565,637
9,876,318
9,539,700
11,364,335
9,122,373
9,118,649
11,961,592
13,485,504

22,125,537
26,319,175
26,629,892
35,916,338
35,536,186
43,342,264
49,478,293
51,322,499
63,781,017
52,679,130
32,748,184
32,120,658
42,001,568

17,546,722
26,706,975
26,872,347
34,779,814
41,326,284
40,176,836
32,808,117
41,287,061
49,133,088
47,638,165
36,911,292
47,669,031
54,391,211

86,924,737
94,687,024
101,521,278
120,517,753
150,826,345
157,989,290
147,116,869
165,712,961
196,675,289
164,753,343
160,855,609
205,129,663
241,493,136

Deductions not allocable to specific types of income
Year

Number of
returns

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

5,147
6,322
7,199
6,710
6,100
6,569
5,927
5,789
5,917
5,478
4,767
5,409
5,502

Foreign
tax credit
claimed
21,532,736
22,894,610
25,418,684
30,415,605
40,254,937
42,222,743
37,338,380
38,271,294
48,355,433
41,358,458
42,419,115
49,963,270
56,593,276

Source: Statistics of Income Division, U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
Note: Entries are drawn from information reported by corporations claiming the foreign tax credit. Figures in
the table are thousands of current dollars.

TABLE 2
INDUSTRY DETAIL OF FOREIGN EXPENSE ALLOCATION, 2004

Total

Research and
development

Interest

Other

Taxable
foreign
income
(less loss)
before
adjustments

110,817,387
*21,971

13,485,504
*673

42,001,568
*10,534

54,391,211
*10,633

241,493,136
107,736

56,593,276
11,559

112
7
235
1,039
658

1,022,125
*54,649
21,810
46,096,041
2,686,030

*23,501
0
*101
10,906,052
70,576

482,400
*29,501
*890
15,239,527
1,019,125

482,337
*25,026
*20,493
19,617,336
1,445,641

4,418,975
*89,888
108,170
154,593,276
11,669,584

1,434,081
*29,961
21,821
37,151,333
2,985,951

68

1,335,443

*25,432

8,600

1,295,194

2,444,326

197,508

607
965
1,603

6,660,160
23,114,114
29,805,044

2,145,207
*15,804
298,157

704,809
11,017,958
13,488,225

3,753,108
11,823,907
15,917,537

14,580,764
29,584,426
23,895,992

2,764,509
5,745,227
6,251,328

Deductions not allocable to specific types of income
Industries
All industries
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and hunting
Mining
Utilities
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale and
retail trade
Transportation and
warehousing
Information
FIRE
Services

Number of
returns
5,502
210

Foreign tax
credit
claimed

Source: Statistics of Income Division, U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
Note: Entries are drawn from information reported by corporations claiming the foreign tax credit in 2004. Figures in the
table are thousands of 2004 dollars. Entries in cells marked by an asterisk (*) are based on such small numbers of significant
reporting firms that the figures may be unreliable.

larger fraction of foreign income than
in manufacturing. Manufacturing firms
accounted for $10.9 billion of the $13.5
billion total allocated R&D expense, but
significantly smaller fractions of other
expenses.

billion. Service industry corporations and
those in the finance, insurance and real
estate industries allocated a total of $49.9
billion of domestic expenses against total
foreign income of just $53.5 billion, the
allocated expenses representing a much
465
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to deduct domestic expenses for interest
and supportive activities such as general and administrative activities. These
expenses would be allocated between
domestic and foreign income based on
measures of domestic and foreign assets
or incomes, with the portion allocated to
foreign income effectively nondeductible
for domestic (or foreign) tax purposes.
The same treatment of domestic expenses
appears in the territorial tax reform proposals considered by the U.S. Congress,
Joint Committee on Taxation (2005), the
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal
Income Tax Reform (2005), and the U.S.
Treasury (2007). Hence, from a U.S. tax
reform proposal standpoint, exempting
foreign income from taxation appears to
be closely associated with limiting the
deductibility of domestic expenses.
This is a curious association, since
exempting foreign income from home
country taxation while limiting the
deductibility of domestic expenses based
on levels of foreign and domestic activity
essentially replaces one tax on foreign
operations with another. An expense
allocation method that permits taxpayers
to claim domestic tax deductions for only
a fraction of domestic expenses, with the
fraction equal to the ratio of domestic to
total income, penalizes earning foreign
income and rewards earning domestic
income. The implied tax rate on foreign
income is the product of the statutory
tax rate, the ratio of domestic expenses
to worldwide income, and the ratio of
domestic to worldwide income. The
implied rate of subsidy for producing
domestic income is the product of the
statutory tax rate, the ratio of domestic
expenses to worldwide income, and the
ratio of foreign to worldwide income.4
Replacing a tax on foreign income with

The U.S. expense allocation rules influence the demand for R&D, administrative,
and other activities in the United States,
since firms with highly taxed foreign
income do not benefit from full tax
deductibility even in cases in which they
incur expenses in order to earn income in
the United States. The reason is that the
allocation method does not attempt to
identify the location of income generated
by each expense, but instead implicitly
attributes location on the basis of total
foreign and domestic income and activity.
More importantly, the expense allocation
rules discourage foreign activity and
foreign income production by firms with
excess foreign tax credits, since the scope
of its foreign operations affects the ability
of a firm to benefit from tax deductions
for a given amount of domestic expense.
This limit on the effective deductibility
of domestic expenses acts as a type of tax
on marginal foreign activity, one whose
rate depends on the firm’s excess foreign
tax credit status and the magnitude of
its allocable domestic expenses. This tax
encourages firms to substitute domestic
for foreign activity, with greater substitution incentives for firms with significant
domestic expenses.
Reform Proposals
Numerous recent reform proposals
would change U.S. taxation of foreign
income by exempting active foreign business income from U.S. taxation. As proposed, schemes such as those analyzed by
Graetz and Oosterhuis (2001), Grubert and
Mutti (2001), and Altshuler and Grubert
(2008) would exempt from U.S. taxation
dividends received from foreign subsidiaries. At the same time, these reforms
would limit the ability of American firms
4

This is apparent by writing the firm’s cost of domestic expense allocation as Rt(F/F + D), in which R is the
level of allocable domestic expense, t is the domestic tax rate, F is foreign income, and D is domestic income.
Differentiating this expression with respect to F produces: [R/(F + D)]t[D/(F + D)]. Similarly, differentiating
the expression with respect to D yields: –[R/(F + D)]t[F/(F + D)].
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an exemption system that limits the
deductibility of domestic expenses does
not remove the tax burden on foreign business activity, but instead merely changes
the form of the tax burden and makes it
less transparent.
There is an understandable appeal to
limiting the deductibility of domestic
expenses when the foreign portion of a
firm’s income is exempt from domestic
taxation, and indeed, tax systems commonly restrict expense deductibility if
the underlying income is untaxed. A
prominent example, frequently cited by
international tax reform proposals, is the
restriction preventing American taxpayers
from deducting interest payments if the
borrowed capital is devoted to tax–exempt
investments such as state and local bonds.
This restriction on interest deductibility is
intended to prevent arbitrage, though it is
widely believed that, in the case of state
and local bonds, its net effect is actually to
create arbitrage opportunities by restricting demand for tax–preferred assets to a
limited clientele of high tax rate potential
buyers. Critics (e.g., Shakow (1987)) have
called for repealing the restriction on interest deductibility to eliminate this problem, which might serve as a cautionary
tale for those who would limit domestic
expense deductibility in a territorial tax
system.

fare. These claims about the underlying
welfare economics, introduced by Peggy
Musgrave (Richman, 1963; Musgrave,
1969) and subsequently quite influential,
have come under considerable academic
fire in recent years. Modern economic
thinking parts company with Musgrave’s
analysis in incorporating the effects of
world capital markets and, in particular,
the impact of ownership on capital asset
productivity.
Capital Export Neutrality and National
Neutrality
The Musgrave notion of capital export
neutrality is the doctrine that the return to
capital should be taxed at the same total
rate regardless of the location in which it is
earned. If a home country tax system satisfies capital export neutrality, then investments that maximize after–tax returns also
maximize pre–tax returns, and there are
then circumstances in which decentralized
profit–maximizing behavior is consistent
with global economic efficiency. The capital export neutrality concept is frequently
invoked as a normative justification for
the design of tax systems similar to that
used by the United States, since accrual
taxation of worldwide income with provision of unlimited foreign tax credits
satisfies capital export neutrality. This
does not describe the U.S. tax system,
however, since taxpayers are permitted
to defer home country taxation of certain
unrepatriated foreign income, and foreign
tax credits are limited, but the capital
export neutrality notion is nevertheless
the basis of the argument that systems of
taxing foreign income similar to that used
by the United States enhance world welfare. The argument can then be extended
to say that, due to international cooperative bargaining, countries that adopt tax
policies advancing world welfare thereby

THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INCOME5
The older wisdom in the international
tax policy area is that worldwide taxation
of business income with provision of foreign tax credits promotes world welfare,
whereas worldwide taxation of business income without foreign tax credits
(instead permitting taxpayers to deduct
foreign tax payments in calculating taxable income) promotes domestic wel-

5

This section draws on material in Desai and Hines (2003, 2004) and Hines (forthcoming).
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may ultimately advance even their own
welfares (Shaviro, 2007).
The Musgrave analysis implies that
governments that seek to maximize
national but not necessarily world welfare
should tax the foreign incomes of their
resident companies while permitting
only deductions for foreign taxes paid.
Such taxation satisfies what is known as
national neutrality, discouraging foreign
investment by imposing a form of double
taxation, but doing so in the interest of the
home country that disregards the value of
tax revenue collected by foreign governments. From the standpoint of the home
country, foreign taxes are simply costs
of doing business abroad and, therefore,
warrant the same treatment as other
costs, for which it is appropriate to give
deductions and not credits against home
country taxes. In this analysis, the home
country’s desired allocation of capital is
one in which its firms equate marginal
after–tax foreign returns with marginal
pretax domestic returns, a condition that
is satisfied by full taxation of foreign
income after deduction of foreign taxes.
This line of thinking suggests that the
American policy of taxing foreign income
while granting foreign tax credits is far
too generous from the standpoint of the
United States. In this view there is a tension between tax policies that advance
national welfare by taxing after–tax
foreign income, and those that advance
global welfare by taxing foreign income
while permitting taxpayers to claim foreign tax credits. The practice of most of
the world in effectively exempting most
foreign income from taxation, is, by this
reasoning, difficult to understand, since
it is inconsistent with either national or
global interests.

6

Ownership Neutrality
Investment by domestic firms at home
and abroad is likely to influence investment by foreign firms, which is inconsistent with the logic underlying capital
export neutrality and national neutrality.
If greater investment abroad by home–
country firms triggers greater investment by domestic or foreign firms in the
home country, and there is considerable
evidence that it does,6 then it no longer
follows that the home country maximizes
its welfare by taxing foreign income while
permitting only a deduction for foreign
taxes paid. The reason is that, from the
standpoint of the home country, greater
foreign investment by domestic firms does
not come at the cost of reduced domestic
investment, so there is no longer a welfare
loss associated with reducing investment
that is already excessively discouraged
by domestic taxes. From the standpoint
of global welfare, if home and foreign
firms compete for the ownership of capital
around the world, and the productivity
of an investment depends on its ownership, then it is no longer the case that the
taxation of foreign income together with
the provision of foreign tax credits necessarily contributes to global productive
efficiency.
The importance of ownership to productivity is reflected in the modern theory
of foreign direct investment, which is
based on a transaction–cost approach
whereby the market advantages of multinational firms stem from the benefits
conferred by joint ownership of assets
across locations. It is also consistent with
the scale of operation of the large and
extremely active worldwide market in
mergers, acquisitions, and asset divesti-

This includes aggregate time–series evidence of the behavior of U.S. multinational firms (Desai, Foley and
Hines, 2005), aggregate evidence for Australia (Faeth, 2006), industry–level studies of Germany (Arndt, Buch,
and Schnitzer, 2007) and Canada (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003), and firm–level evidence for the United States (Desai,
Foley and Hines, forthcoming), the United Kingdom (Simpson, 2008) and Germany (Kleinert and Toubal,
2007).
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and not tax differences, thereby meeting
the requirements for capital ownership
neutrality. In this case the total tax burden on foreign and domestic investment
varies between taxpayers with different
home countries, but every investor has an
incentive to allocate investments in a way
that maximizes pretax returns.
The same circumstances that make
capital ownership neutrality desirable
from the standpoint of world welfare also
imply that countries disregarding world
welfare have incentives to exempt foreign
income from taxation no matter what
other countries do. The reason is that,
from an ownership standpoint, additional
outbound foreign investment does not
reduce domestic tax revenue, since any net
reduction in home–country investment by
domestic firms is offset by greater investment by foreign firms. With unchanging
domestic tax revenue, home–country
welfare increases in the after–tax profitability of domestic companies, which is
maximized if foreign profits are exempt
from taxation. Tax systems that exempt
foreign income from taxation are, therefore, said to satisfy national ownership
neutrality. Hence, it is possible to understand why so many countries exempt foreign income from taxation, and it follows
that, if every country did so, tax systems
would conform, capital ownership would
be allocated efficiently, and global output
would thereby be maximized.

tures, with participating firms willing to
bear the costs of the associated ownership
realignments in return for the advantages
that are associated with them. The modern
property rights approach to the theory of
the firm, as developed in Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990),
suggests that the prevalence of incomplete
contracts justifies particular configurations of ownership arrangements. It is the
ability to exercise power through residual
rights when contracts cannot prespecify
outcomes that makes ownership important, and such settings are particularly
likely to characterize multinational firms
investing abroad. Desai, Foley and Hines
(2004) analyze the changing ownership
decisions of multinational firms, finding that globalization has made firms
reluctant to share ownership of foreign
affiliates, given the higher returns to coordinated transactions inside firms.
Tax systems satisfy capital ownership
neutrality if they do not distort ownership patterns (Desai and Hines, 2003,
2004). Capital ownership neutrality is
important to efficiency only insofar as
ownership is important to efficiency, a
notion that is ruled out by assumption in
the Musgrave framework that serves as
the basis of capital export neutrality and
national neutrality. If the productivity of
a business asset depends on who owns it
together with other assets, then tax systems promote efficiency if they encourage
the most productive ownership of assets
within the set of feasible investors.
Capital ownership neutrality is satisfied
if all countries exempt foreign income
from taxation, since taxation would then
not favor one set of potential investors at
the expense of another, but the exemption
of foreign income from taxation is not
necessary for capital ownership neutrality
to be satisfied. If all countries tax foreign
income (possibly at different rates), while
permitting taxpayers to claim foreign
tax credits, then ownership would be
determined by productivity differences

Implications for Domestic Expense
Deductions
Competing efficiency concepts carry
differing implications for efficient taxation
of foreign income, which in turn influence
the desirability of permitting taxpayers to
take deductions for domestic expenses. If
international investors do not compete for
potential ownership of the same assets,
and greater foreign investment comes at
the cost of reduced domestic investment,
then governments promote national
469

NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
both to shed some of their foreign assets
and to acquire other firms that have significant domestic assets. Firms unable to
claim full deductions for their domestic
expenses would also become attractive
targets for foreign takeovers structured
so that the combined firm was not subject
to the expense allocation rules. Indeed, a
tax system inevitably influences business
ownership decisions whenever the tax
treatment of domestic expenses is contingent on the ownership of foreign assets or
the receipt of foreign income.
Firms with foreign income that is
exempt from home–country taxation
have incentives to allocate capital, management attention, and other resources
between foreign and domestic production so that the after–foreign–tax marginal productivity of resources devoted
to foreign production just equals the
after–home–tax marginal productivity of
the same resources devoted to domestic
production. This marginal productivity
condition is efficient because it reflects
the tradeoffs made by most of the world’s
investors and is, therefore, capitalized into
market prices. It follows that efficiency
also requires that firms choosing among
domestic expenses that contribute to
domestic and foreign profitability similarly equate after–foreign–tax marginal
foreign profitability with after–home–tax
domestic profitability, since otherwise
productivity could be augmented by
altering the mix of capital and current
expenditures. This marginal productivity
condition for expenses is satisfied only if
domestic expenses are fully deductible
and, therefore, not contingent on the locations in which the corresponding income
is earned.

welfare by taxing foreign income on
accrual while providing only deductions
for foreign income tax payments. Under
the same circumstances, governments
promote global welfare by permitting taxpayers to claim tax credits for foreign tax
payments, a policy that may also advance
national welfare if nations cooperate to
share the benefits of international economic policies. In both of these cases, full
deductibility of domestic expenses is consistent with efficiency. Governments that
tax foreign income while permitting only
a deduction for foreign income tax payments subject after–foreign–tax returns
to home country taxation, and expenses
incurred to produce these returns are
properly deductible. Governments that
tax worldwide income while providing foreign tax credits do so to promote
global efficiency; since domestic plus
foreign returns are cumulatively taxed at
the domestic tax rate, efficiency requires
that the expenses incurred to produce
these returns should be deductible at the
domestic tax rate.
If greater foreign activity is accompanied by higher levels of domestic activity, and the ownership of active business
assets influences their productivity, then
countries benefit from exempting foreign
income from taxation, and global efficiency
requires that all nations tax foreign income
in the same way. In this setting it follows
that the exemption of foreign income
should be accompanied by permitting
full deductibility of domestic expenses,
since doing so advances national welfare,
and is consistent with global efficiency if
it is also the practice of other countries.
A policy that instead limits domestic
expense deductions based on indicators
of relative foreign and domestic activity
or income would effectively tax foreign
income, thereby introducing ownership
distortions. For example, if a country permits only a portion of domestic expenses
to be deducted by firms owning foreign
assets, the affected firms have incentives

ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC EXPENSE
DEDUCTIONS
This section offers an analytic evaluation of the domestic expense deduction
rule that promotes efficiency as captured
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by each of the norms described in the
third section. It is most straightforward
first to consider the case in which a home
government treats foreign taxes simply
as costs of doing business and, therefore,
permits only a deduction for foreign
income tax payments, unmindful of the
ownership distortions associated with
such a policy. An individual firm spends
R at home to produce both domestic and
foreign income, the value of its domestic
production (net of other expenses) being
denoted Q(R), and the value of its production through a wholly owned foreign
affiliate being denoted Q*(R). In order to
abstract from issues of discounting and
the taxation of capital returns, it is helpful
to think of R as a current expense, such
as administrative cost, that contributes
to income production this year only. The
home country taxes business income
at rate τ, and the foreign country taxes
income at rate τ∗. The home country permits the firm to deduct a fraction α of its
expenditures on R against home country
taxable income, and the foreign country
permits the firm to deduct a fraction γ
of its expenditures on R against taxable
income in the foreign country. Critically,
γ is assumed to be unaffected by α (and
in practice is typically zero).
The firm’s after–tax profit is denoted π,
which with this regime of taxing foreign
income takes the value:

Taking foreign taxes to be costs, the home
country’s return is Q(R) + Q*(R)(1 – τ*) +
τ*γR – R, the difference between domestic
profits plus after–tax foreign profits and
the cost of domestic inputs. The first–order
condition for maximizing the home
country’s return is then:
[3] Q ′ ( R ) + Q * ′ ( R ) ( 1 − τ * ) + τ * γ = 1.
Together, equations [2] and [3] imply
that α = 1. Hence, the home country
maximizes its total return by permitting
taxpayers to deduct all of their domestic
expenses, even though some of these
expenses may contribute to productivity
in the foreign country, and even though
(although this is rarely the case) some of
the expenses might be deductible in the
foreign country.
This implication is consistent with the
intuition that a home country that taxes
foreign income should also permit full
deductibility of domestic expenses associated with producing that income. Partial
deductibility excessively discourages
expenditures that create net value for the
home country, so aligning taxpayer and
national incentives therefore requires
full deductibility. It is noteworthy that
γ does not influence the implication that
the home country maximizes value by
permitting full deductibility, since a positive value of γ not only increases a firm’s
incentive to spend on R, but also increases
the home country’s return, which includes
any foreign tax savings.7
It is very uncommon for countries to
tax active foreign business income while
providing only deductions for foreign
income tax payments; instead, countries
that tax foreign income typically provide
foreign tax credits. The paradigmatic
case of worldwide taxation with foreign
tax credits is a system in which the home

[1] π = ⎡⎣Q ( R ) + Q * ( R ) ( 1 − τ * ) + τ * γ R ⎤⎦

(1 − τ ) − R + τα R.

A profit–maximizing firm chooses R to
maximize the value of π in equation [1],
for which the first order condition is:
[2] ⎡⎣Q ′ ( R ) + Q * ′ ( R ) ( 1 − τ * ) + τ * γ ⎤⎦
(1 − τ ) = 1 − τα .
7

Recall that γ is assumed to be fixed; if international cost sharing agreements or other arrangements were to
make the level of γ contingent on α, then it would no longer necessarily follow that full domestic deductibility
maximizes home country returns.
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country taxes foreign income without
deferral and with unlimited provision of
foreign tax credits (including the possibility of a rebate if foreign tax rates exceed
the home country rate). From the standpoint of home country firms facing such a
regime of taxing their foreign investments,
the foreign tax system becomes irrelevant,
since any reduction in foreign taxes is
immediately offset by greater home
country taxes. The firm’s after–tax profit,
therefore, can be represented as:

The implication that domestic expenses
should be fully deductible against domestic income may not conform exactly to the
common intuition that expenses incurred
to produce foreign income should be
deductible against home country taxable
income to the extent that foreign income
is taxed by the home country. Certainly
in the case of worldwide taxation with
foreign tax credits, the home country
taxes foreign income, but the tax rate is
zero if the average foreign tax rate equals
the home country tax rate, and the home
country tax rate on foreign income is
negative if the foreign tax rate exceeds the
domestic tax rate. In all of these cases, the
analysis of equations [5] and [6] implies
that efficiency requires the home government to permit full deductibility of
domestic expenses. The reason is that the
policy of worldwide taxation is premised
on the notion that a country benefits by
enacting domestic tax rules that maximize
the world allocation of resources. Since
both domestic and foreign returns are
effectively taxed at the domestic tax rate,
efficient incentives to devote resources
to R require that the expense be fully
deductible at the domestic tax rate also.
By taxing foreign income and providing
foreign tax credits the home country tax
system removes any incentives created by
foreign deductibility of expenses incurred
in the home country, so it is necessary to
provide full domestic deductibility to get
the incentives right.8
Perhaps the most telling case is that
in which the home country maximizes
national welfare by promoting efficient
asset ownership through exempting foreign income from taxation. With foreign
income exempt from home country taxes,
the firm’s after tax profits are:

[4] π = ⎡⎣Q ( R ) + Q * ( R ) ⎤⎦ ( 1 − τ ) − R + τα R.
The first order condition corresponding to
the profit–maximizing choice of R is:
[5] ⎡⎣Q ′ ( R ) + Q * ′ ( R ) ⎤⎦ ( 1 − τ ) = 1 − τα .
The standard rationale behind having a
system of worldwide taxation and unlimited foreign tax credits is to maximize
world welfare by promoting capital export
neutrality, as discussed in the third section. In this framework, world economic
welfare is given by the difference between
world output and the cost of world inputs,
without regard to tax considerations.
Maximizing world welfare in this context
therefore corresponds to maximizing
Q(R) + Q*(R) – R, for which the first order
condition is:
[6] Q ′ ( R ) + Q * ′ ( R ) = 1.
It is clear from inspection of equations
[5] and [6] that once more the welfare
maximizing policy is α = 1, full domestic
deductibility of domestic expenses, and
again this is unaffected by whether or
not the foreign country permits partial
deductibility with a positive value of γ.
8

It is worth noting that, in the unlikely event that the foreign government permits deductibility of a portion of
home country expenditures on R through a positive value of γ, the home government immediately recoups
the value of the deductibility by granting the home country taxpayer fewer foreign tax credits. Hence, from
a government budgetary perspective, the cost of full deductibility of home–country expenses is offset to
whatever extent foreign governments permit partial deductions for these expenses.
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[7] π = Q ( R ) ( 1 − τ ) + Q * ( R ) ( 1 − τ * )

to deduct all of their domestic expenses follows from the relative valuation of foreign
and domestic pretax incomes. This relative
valuation is driven by the world market,
which values after–tax income equally in
every country, and which allocates capital
and other resources in a manner consistent
with this valuation. Individual countries
benefit from adopting policies that are consistent with world valuations of after–tax
income, which is why it is attractive to
exempt foreign income from taxation
and also why it is attractive to permit full
deductibility of domestic expenses.

+τα R + τ * γ R − R.
A profit maximizing firm chooses R to
satisfy:
[8] Q ′ ( R ) ( 1 − τ ) + Q * ′ ( R ) ( 1 − τ * )
+τ * γ = 1 − τα .
It is important to identify the government’s objective in this situation. Exempting foreign income from taxation makes
sense from the standpoint of encouraging efficient asset ownership, given the
importance of ownership to productivity.
Exempting foreign income from taxation implies that the government values
equally one dollar of after–tax domestic
income earned by home–country firms
and one dollar of after–foreign–tax foreign
income, since home–country firms make
this tradeoff at the margin. This relative
valuation is sensible in a world of shifting
ownership, since it is effectively imposed
by the world capital market. Then the
government chooses international tax
policy to maximize:
[9] Q ( R ) +

CONCLUSION
Why should a country that exempts
foreign income from taxation nevertheless permit full domestic deductions for
expenditures that contribute to foreign
profitability? The rationale for domestic
expense deductibility is the same as the
rationale for exempting foreign income
from taxation: that tax systems with these
features foster productivity associated
with efficient ownership. The intuitive
criticism that it is wrong to permit a
deduction for an expense that generates
untaxed income overlooks the important role of foreign investors and begs
the question of why the home country
exempts foreign income from taxation in
the first place. The plain fact is that most
countries in the world both exempt active
foreign business income from taxation
and permit full domestic deductibility
of home–country expenses; and there
are sound economic reasons why these
policies go together and make sense in a
world of shifting ownership.

Q * ( R )(1 − τ *) + τ * γ R
− R.
(1 − τ )

The term (1 – τ) appears in the denominator of the second term of [9] to reflect the
fact that after–home–tax domestic income
and after–foreign–tax foreign income are
valued equally. Then maximizing the
value of [9] implies:
[10] Q ′ ( R ) ( 1 − τ ) + Q * ′ ( R ) ( 1 − τ * )
+τ * γ = 1 − τ ,
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